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BLACKMAILERS, BRIBE TAKERS, AND
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The criminalization of blackmail has been considered paradoxi-
cal because it would make unlawful a threat to do something the
threatener has a legal right to do. The blackmailer threatens to
disclose an embarrassing or harmful secret of the victim unless she
1
is paid for secrecy. She may lawfully disclose the victim's secret?
and may lawfully make an unconditional threat to disclose it.3 The
threat becomes unlawful only when coupled with an offer to keep
the secret in return for payment. 4 Yet, most victims of blackmail
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1 As a stylistic convention, this paper will use feminine pronouns to refer to
persons who are menaces, blackmailers, and bribe-takers and masculine pronouns to
refer to persons who are blackmail victims and bribers. This arbitrary usage serves
to clarify some otherwise ambiguous passages and is not intended to suggest any
gender-based generalizations about real world perpetrators or victims of blackmail.
2 1 am assuming the absence of statutory, fiduciary, tort, or contractual obligations
to the contrary. See e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (finding
defendant guilty of insider trading due to a violation of his fiduciary duty to protect
his employer's confidential information). Under some circumstances, disclosure of
an embarrassing secret might constitute an invasion of privacy, outrageous conduct,
or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 46 (1965) (describing liability for outrageous conduct causing severe emotional
distress); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (describing liability for
invasion of privacy).
3 See Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 962-63 (N.D. Ill. 1968), revd on other
grounds sub nom., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Richard A. Epstein, Blackmai4
Inc., 50 U. CH. L. REV. 553, 557 n.6, 558 (1983) (threats to do what one has a right
to do are "essential to the preservation of any system of liberties, for if one person
does not have the right to threaten actions that he may or may not do, he has to act
without giving warning. This in turn will work to the disadvantage of the other party,
who is now deprived of the choice that the threat would have otherwise given him.").
An unconditional threat must be distinguished from a conditional threat, or a
threat coupled with an offer to refrain from the threatened action if the victim
cooperates in some way. When Professor Gordon argues that it is not paradoxical to
criminalize threats to do something that the threatener has a right to do, she seems
to be referring to conditional threats. See WendyJ. Gordon, Truth and Consequences:
The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1742-46 (1993).
4 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(3) & cmt. 2(g) (1980) (theft by extortion) ("A
person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by threatening
to ... expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute .... ").
(1663)
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would presumably prefer such an offer to an unconditional threat:
the offer cannot make the victim worse off than the unconditional
threat and it might make him better off by giving him an opportuni-
ty to buy the menace's silence. Thus, it seems paradoxical to permit
the unconditional threat and prohibit blackmail.
Existing theories attack the paradox by arguing that the
blackmail exchange only appears to be mutually beneficial, but is in
fact either wrongful or wasteful. They justify the law prohibiting
blackmail as a way of preventing this exchange from taking place.
But these theories ignore a second paradox of blackmail: it is not
unlawful for one who knows another's secret to accept an offer of
payment made by an unthreatened victim in return for a potential
blackmailer's promise not to disclose the secret. What would
otherwise be an unlawful blackmail exchange is a lawful sale of
secrecy if it takes the form of a "bribe."5 Lawful bribery poses an
obvious challenge to theories that are premised on either the
wrongfulness or wastefulness of the blackmail exchange: both
5 Throughout this paper, the term "bribe" will be used to refer to the lawful
purchase of a secrecy agreement by an unthreatened victim. Economists have used
the term "bribery" nontechnically to refer to paying someone to refrain from taking
some action that the person is entitled to take. See GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF
AccIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS 150-52 (1970) (contending that in the
absence of information suggesting which party can more cheaply avoid a risk, the law
should allocate the costs of an accident to the "best briber," the one who can most
cheaply enter into exchanges to reallocate the risk); RIcHARD A. PosNEa, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 600-02 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that to an economist, settlement of
a legal claim is a form of "perfectly lawful bribery"); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 43 (1975) (arguing that
because blackmail and bribery consist of payments in exchange for not enforcing the
law, where there is no public monopoly, bribery will be permitted, such as when a
case is settled out of court).
This article excludes unlawful or unenforceable confidentiality agreements, such
as those that would constitute criminal bribery, obstruction ofjustice, or subornation
of perjury. See Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir.
1972) (refusing on public policy grounds to enforce oil well lessee's claim that
defendant surveyor breached a contract forbidding disclosure of the results of a well
directional survey that showed that lessee was tortiously obtaining oil from adjoining
tract); Alan B. Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and the Public Interest
in Disclosure; Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RcH. L. REv. 109, 114-15 (1989)
(describing a plaintiff's use of threats to disclose information obtained under a
protective order if the defendant does not agree to settle a lawsuit). A Florida statute
makes confidentiality agreements providing for nondisclosure of information about
hazards that are dangerous to public health unlawful. See FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081
(Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act) (1991); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery
Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 457,465. On the relationship between
blackmail and criminal bribery, see James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice
of the Bribey Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. (1993) 1695, 1695-1704.
BLACKMAILERS & BRIBE TAKERS
blackmailers and bribe-takers accept money for silence and the bribe
transaction seems to entail the same economic costs as does
blackmail.
An adequate theoretical justification for the prohibition of
blackmail should explain both of its paradoxes. However, a review
of contemporary theories of blackmail shows that they are able
neither to explain why blackmail is criminalized nor to rationalize
the different treatment of blackmail and bribery. This review
suggests that the paradoxes of blackmail may not yield to rational
analysis.
In contrast to deductive analyses premised on rights or econom-
ics, this paper offers an account of bribery and blackmail that is
premised on their different social meanings. I suggest that the legal
and moral treatment of bribery and blackmail spring from separate,
unrelated societal prototypes or narratives that express ideas of
community and solidarity, rather than economic rationality or
individual rights. Abandoning the search for a unified instru-
mentalist theory, this account seeks instead to define the social
meaning of bribery and blackmail.
I. A CRITIQUE OF SOME ECONOMIC THEORIES OF BLACKMAIL
A. The Economics of Secrets
Theorists of blackmail who utilize economic analyses seek to
justify the prohibition of the blackmail threat on the basis of net
social cost. These theorists argue that the blackmail transaction
reduces social wealth, either by being wasteful in itself or by
creating incentives for wasteful behavior. They justify criminal
prohibition of blackmail threats as the most efficient means of
reducing this social cost.
6
In economic terms, both blackmail and noncriminal bribery are
exchanges that internalize an externality.7 The risk of negative
externalities arises whenever one person (a "menace") has the power
to act in a way that would inflict harm on another person (a
6 Reduction of social costs is, at least to some theorists, an insuffidentjustification
for criminalizing behavior. See, e.g., Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1656-57 (1993).
7 Externalities are costs or benefits conferred by a market exchange on third
parties without their consent. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
EcONoMics 45-46 (1988); George Daley &J. Fred Giertz, Externalities, Extortion, and
Efficiency, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 997, 997-99 (1975).
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"victim") without violating any legal rule and without incurring legal
liability to pay compensation for the harm. Because the law does
not require the menace to take the victim's loss into account in
deciding whether to act, the menace may act in ways that create net
social costs. In more traditional terms of legal analysis, the menace
possesses the power to harm a victim as an incident to the exercise
of a legal right or privilege.
8
Both bribery and blackmail exemplify a typical response to
externalities: an exchange in which the menace agrees to forbear
from causing harm in return for payment. Forbearance exchanges
in which the victim purchases a property or contract right that
prohibits the harmful act are common features of economic life.9
These exchanges alter the legal relations between the parties so as
either to disable the menace from inflicting the harm or to obligate
her to pay compensation if she inflicts it. The externality is thus
internalized in the sense that the menace must take the victim's loss
(and her own potential liability) into account in deciding whether to
do the harmful act.
1 0
A frequent subject of forbearance exchanges is secrecy: actual
or potential menaces sell promises of secrecy to actual or potential
victims. Examples include an attorney's promise not to disclose the
confidences of a client, a departing employee's agreement not to
disclose the trade secrets of an employer, a settling litigant's
agreement not to disclose what she learned during civil discovery,
or a blackmailer's agreement not to disclose the secret of her victim.
8 In Hohfeldian terms, a menace has a right to cause the harm if he can enforce
the performance of a duty by the victim, including a duty of noninterference with the
menace's action; the menace has a privilege to cause the harm if the victim has no
right to prevent him from doing it, or to penalize him thereafter. See Wesley N.
Holifeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied inJudicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
LJ. 16 (1913).
9 Examples include a property owner's purchase of a negative easement from a
neighbor, a devisee's purchase of a quitclaim deed from a potential adverse claimant,
an employer's purchase from an employee of a covenant not to compete, and a
corporation's repurchase of its shares held by corporate raiders.
10 In his classic study of the relation of legal rules to social cost, Ronald Coase
repeatedly illustrated how such exchanges could lead to allocatively efficient results
regardless of the initial allocation of legal entitlements to cause such harm. See
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-15 (1960). Half of the
reallocative exchanges that he described were forbearance exchanges in which the
party legally entitled to harm the other was paid to refrain from such harm. In the
other half, the parties engaged in "permissive exchanges" by which the party entitled
to be free from harm was paid to permit it. See id.
BLACKMAILERS & BRIBE TAKERS
The market power of a seller of secrecy depends upon whether
she knows the secret at the time of the sale. At the time of the fee
agreement, for example, the attorney has not yet learned the client's
secret. If she sells her services in a competitive market, she must
bid against others who might also offer secrecy. The price she wil
charge for confidentiality-the portion of the fee necessary to
compensate her for this promise-will be a function of her opportu-
nity cost in forgoing the future ability to disclose the secret." In
the case of the attorney, it will usually be small. 2
By contrast, the departing employee, the litigant, and the
blackmailer have learned the secret before the sale. A menace who
has learned her victim's secret is a monopolist because her disclo-
sure alone is sufficient to harm the victim and she is the only person
who can sell protection from that disclosure. The price she will
charge usually tends to be a function of the harm that disclosure
would cause the victim rather than a function of her opportunity
cost in forgoing the disclosure.
Even though it may involve such monopoly power, however, a
confidentiality agreement is presumptively beneficial to both parties.
Any price the parties agreed upon would be less than the cost to the
victim of suffering disclosure1 3 and more than the value to the
menace of making disclosure. 14  Therefore a confidentiality
exchange, in the absence of other effects, would increase social
utility, since each party would be better off after the exchange than
1 See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 32-36 (discussing the tendency
of price to approach the marginal cost of production in competitive markets).
12 The cost of confidentiality is not zero, given both the occasional liability of an
attorney for violating the privilege and the effect of such an obligation on an
attorney's ability to represent other clients.
Is If the seller is a monopolist, however, as in the typical case of blackmail, then
the price of confidentiality may capture almost all the utility that the victim would
obtain from the exchange. Thus, in the typical situation in which the blackmailer
"bleeds" the victim repeatedly, the exchange is only slightly beneficial from the
victim's point of view.
14 This value represents the opportunity cost to the menace of forgoing the
exercise of the privilege to disclose the secret. It includes not only the possibility of
selling the information to another buyer but also the nonmonetary enjoyment the
menace might experience in making the disclosure. This value is negative if
disclosure would be more costly to the menace than nondisclosure. This might be the
case, for example, if the secret involved an embarrassing event in which both the
menace and the victim were participants. If the opportunity cost of disclosure is not
positive, the menace will presumably not make the disclosure, regardless of whether
a forbearance exchange has taken place.
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before it. As the next section shows, however, there may be many
such effects.
B. Is Blackmail Really Inefficient?
First, the confidentiality agreement may be allocatively ineffi-
cient because third parties would have valued disclosure of the
secret more than the victim values secrecy. In a world of third
parties, incomplete information, and transaction costs, a confidenti-
ality exchange might be inefficient despite both parties' willingness
to enter it. First, confidentiality may create its own externality by
being more costly to third parties than beneficial to the two
contracting parties. Second, the exchange might be wholly
unnecessary because the menace would not have disclosed the secret
in its absence.1 5 Third, the possibility of such an exchange might
lead the parties to make strategic, nonproductive investments in
bringing it about or preventing it. Finally, because the relationship
between the menace and victim constitutes a bilateral monopoly, the
exchange might be so costly to negotiate and enforce that the gains
from the exchange would be exceeded by transaction costs.1 6 As
will be discussed below, economic reasoning might rationalize laws
against blackmail on grounds that blackmail entails more of these
costs than do other forbearance exchanges.
Even if an argument based on social costs could justify outlawing
blackmail, however, the economic rationale for the present
configuration of the criminal law in this area would remain seriously
incomplete if it did not address an additional anomaly. All the
foregoing points about the possible inefficiency of legalized
blackmail apply equally well to bribery. No less than a blackmail
exchange, a bribe may involve monopolistic profit, may affect third
15 Such an exchange might take place if the menace makes a bluff threat. Because
the menace would not have made good on her threat, the payment to her does not
benefit the victim. Rather, it simply shifts some of the victim's wealth to the menace
at some positive transaction cost.
16 Economists use the term "transaction costs" to refer to the costs the parties
incur in engaging in exchange transactions. One commentator has noted that
transaction costs "include the costs of identifying the parties with whom one has to
bargain, the cost of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining process
itself, and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached." A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 12 (2d ed. 1989). In the usual bargain
between a blackmailer and her victim, neither can deal with any other person. "If
there are significant elements of bilateral monopoly in a two-party transaction, that
is, if neither party has good alternatives to dealing with the other, transaction costs
may be quite high." POSNER, supra note 5, at 62.
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parties, may be unnecessary, may induce strategic investments, and
may entail excessive transaction costs. Once the negotiations begin,
the identity of the initiator is irrelevant to the economic efficiency
of the ensuing transaction.
Yet the bribe-taker is not treated like the blackmailer. So long
as an unthreatened victim first offers to pay the menace for silence,
the resulting exchange subjects neither participant to criminal
liability.17 If one were to take the position that blackmail is
outlawed because it is inefficient, one must then either argue for the
criminalization of bribery or explain why the law permits noncrimi-
nal bribes that accomplish the same result as blackmail. The
following brief review of the economic arguments concerning
blackmail suggests that scholars cannot explain the legal distinction
between blackmail and bribery.
17 This assumes that the court does not construe the menace's behavior as
creating a threatening atmosphere by communicating a threat implicitly. Courts have
interpreted ambiguous communications as threats if they are made by menaces who
otherwise demonstrate an intention to extort. See People v. Oppenheimer, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 18, 24-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (finding that a letter asking "Are all windows
insured?" constituted an implied threat to do property damage), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
975 (1964). The Model Penal Code similarly notes that "the threat need not be
express." MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 cmt. 2(a) (1980).
Courts also use "frame manipulation" to manipulate the amount of context to
be considered in evaluating the menace's action. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 600-16 (1981).
Expanding the frame permits a court facing an apparent victim-initiated exchange to
include prior behavior by the menace that it can then characterize as the threat that
initiated the exchange. See, e.g., United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 395 (1st
Cir.) (upholding Hobbs act conviction for extortion although victim offered the
payment because "[defendant's] exploitation of such a fear amounted to extortion
notwithstanding [the contractor's] readiness and even eagerness to play the game"),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 73 (3d Cir.
1971) ("[I]n a widespread and highly effective extortion conspiracy, potential victims
would be aware of the illicit requirements placed upon contractors and would
succumb in advance of the contracting to the pressure which they knew would be
forthcoming."), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972). Conversely, a charge of extortion
is often met with a defense that the defendant merely accepted a bribe offered by the
victim. See United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638, 640-43 (E.D. Pa. 1965)
(holding defendants guilty of extortion in connection with a public contract and
rejecting their claims of bribery). The distinction between extortion and bribery is
frequently litigated. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889-90 & n.18
(1992) (discussing the interplay between extortion and bribery under the Hobbs Act);
Hathaway, 534 F.2d at 393 (citing circuit court cases interpreting the Hobbs Act);
Addonizio, 451 F.2d at 77 ("[T]he essence of the crime of bribery is voluntariness,
while the essence of extortion is duress.").
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1. "Lawful Blackmail Would Make Enforcement
of Criminal Law Inefficient."
Some economic analysts assert that legalized blackmail would
interfere with optimal law enforcement by increasing the total costs
of law enforcement and by creating inefficient incentives for people
contemplating the criminal and noncriminal acts for which they
could be blackmailed. Thus, Richard Posner argues that legalized
blackmail would lead to an inefficient overenforcement of criminal
laws that would conflict with a "decision to rely on a public
monopoly of law enforcement in some areas of enforcement."
1 8
"Overenforcement" might lead to two different forms of inefficien-
cy. First, Posner argues that private investments in enforcement,
such as those made by blackmailers, would render the total social
investment in crime control suboptimal. He argues that crime can
be deterred at the least cost only if one entity (the government)
controls all enforcement expenditures and can set optimal levels of
criminal apprehension and punishment. But the costs of criminal
law enforcement are themselves a subset of the total social cost of
crime prevention, which includes all investments that raise the ex
ante costs of crime to the potential criminal. The state can never
have a monopoly on crime prevention expenditures, which include
such diverse phenomena as neighborhood watch programs,
surveillance cameras, burglar alarms, armored cars, and karate
lessons. 19 Many of these crime prevention efforts take effect after
the crime takes place, as does blackmail. It seems arbitrary to
classify blackmail as "enforcement" rather than "prevention."
20
18 POSNER, supra note 5, at 601; see also RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 283-85 (1984); Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 42-43. Elsewhere, Judge
Posner has suggested that blackmail laws reduce the price of the information to the
police by "removing a competitor [the criminal] from the buying side of the market."
Richard Posner, An Economic Theoiy of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1200 (1985). But so long as bribery is lawful, and does not, for example, constitute
obstruction ofjustice, the criminal may freely bid for secrecy in competition with the
police. Laws against blackmail merely prevent the menace from making the first
offer.
19 The levels of public and private spending on crime prevention may be
reciprocally related. Posner may be arguing that absolute control of public
enforcement is necessary to drive private spending, and therefore total social cost, to
the optimal level. But prohibition of investments in private spending seems
unnecessary to achieve this outcome.
20 Indeed, historically, the law had a variety of procedural mechanisms which
allowed private citizens to enforce the criminal law, including private prosecutors and
qui tam actions. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 287, 581
(2d ed. 1985) (describing nineteenth century private prosecution and law enforce-
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The case for outlawing blackmail to preserve the state's enforcement
monopoly thus seems uncompelling.
"Overenforcement" might also refer to the inefficiency created
by preventing appropriate levels of the illegal activity from taking
place.21 Because criminal laws are inherently overinclusive, they
prohibit some acts whose benefits outweigh their social costs.
Ideally, prosecutors will refuse to bring charges in such instances.
Posner may be contending that if potential law-breakers thought
that they could be legally blackmailed, their expected cost of the
activity would rise above the optimal level and the desirable level of
law-breaking will not occur.
This argument, too, fails to justify the prohibition of blackmail,
even granting the unprovable assumption that legalized blackmail
would raise rather than lower the expected cost of proscribed
activity. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not lead to
optimal lawbreaking unless potential lawbreakers expect not to be
prosecuted at the time they are deciding whether to commit the
proscribed act. If they correctly anticipate that the prosecutor will
not prosecute, then their expected costs will include the costs of
neither prosecution nor blackmail and they will refuse to pay
blackmail if it is demanded. Conversely, if they incorrectly
anticipate that the prosecutor will prosecute, then their lawbreaking
will be suboptimal because their expected costs will have included
prosecution. In either case, legalized blackmail would seem to have
no effect on optimal crime rates.
22
ment); John AJ. Ward, Private Prosecution-The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. REV.
1171, 1173-77 (1972); Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam
Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341-45 (1989) (discussing the history of the qui tam
enforcement framework).
21 See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 38-43.
22 Generally, any prediction of the incentive effects of legalized blackmail on its
potential victims can be neither established nor refuted in the absence of data which
we simply do not possess. The possibility of being blackmailed represents both a risk
and an opportunity to a person calculating the expected costs of contemplated crime
because the victim typically perceives that the blackmail payment will cost less than
the cost of disclosure. If legalized blackmail did not increase the probability of
detection, it might actually decrease the potential criminal's expected costs of crime
because the criminal could anticipate that at least some menaces would sell silence
rather than tell the police. SeeJennifer G. Brown, Blackmail as PrivateJustice, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1933, 1939-41 (1993).
Legalized blackmail might, however, have other effects that increase the expected
costs of crime. Menaces who would have remained silent might choose to blackmail.
Potential menaces who would not have known of the crime might increase their
efforts at detection in order to sell their silence. The net effects of these responses
on the expected cost of crime cannot be known in the absence of empirical data.
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Finally, the victim-incentive theories of blackmail fail to address
the bribery/blackmail dichotomy. The potential for paying and
accepting bribes will alter both the expected costs of crime and the
incentives to discover a victim's secrets. Posner's analysis suggests
that legal bribes cause inefficient overenforcement of both types.
His rationale for blackmail statutes would equally justify outlawing
bribery, and so fails to account adequately for current law.
2. "Lawful Blackmail Would Lead to Wasteful Investments
of Resources by Blackmailers and Their Victims."
Theories propounded by Ronald Coase, Douglas Ginsburg, and
others justify the prohibition of blackmail as a way of saving the
social cost of wasted behavior. If blackmail were legal, potential
blackmailers would expend resources in seeking out secrets that
they could then sell to potential victims. The expenses of the
blackmailer in making the threat and of the victim in resisting it are
also deadweight social losses that will be saved if the blackmail
transaction is prohibited. 23 In a similar vein, Professor Richard
Epstein argues that legalizing blackmail would lead to the creation
of large enterprises whose entire productive resources would be
given over to the pointless discovery and subsequent suppression of
embarrassing facts.
24
Thus, one cannot determine whether legalized blackmail would increase or decrease
the ex ante costs facing a potential criminal or social deviant.
23 "Blackmail involves the expenditure of resources in the collection of
information which, on payment of blackmail, will be suppressed. It would be better
if this information were not collected and the resources were used to produce
something of value." Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA.
L. REV. 655, 674 (1988); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail:
An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1859-65 (1993); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 163-65 (1980) (asserting
that the combination of immorality and disutility form a reasonable basis for
criminalization).
24 See Epstein, supra note 3, at 564-65 (arguing that such enterprises would lead
to secondary criminal activity by blackmail victims seeking to raise money to pay
menaces). Although some blackmailers may not expend any costs in learning their
victims' secrets, a rule outlawing all blackmail may be the most efficient in a world
fraught with transaction costs. Where judicial determinations are costly and
imperfect, a prohibition of all blackmail would be efficient whenever the cost of
judicially discriminating between casually acquired information and intentionally
acquired information exceeds the social value of the efficient blackmail suppressed.
This cost would include not only the administrative costs of trying such issues but the
significant error costs incurred when the process arrives at an inaccurate judgment.
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One may for the sake of argument grant these assumptions
about the incentive effects of legalized blackmail and still reject the
conclusion that laws against blackmail are efficient. The waste
reduction theory ignores the social cost of suppressing efficient
blackmail exchanges. In all cases in which the menace would
otherwise have disclosed the victim's secret, a blackmail exchange
is at least presumptively efficient from the perspective of the
menace and victim. The victim is able to purchase secrecy, a benefit
to which he is otherwise unentitled and that would be unavailable
in the absence of the exchange. Waste reduction theorists ignore
this benefit by assuming that most blackmailers would not disclose
the secret if they could not blackmail the victim.25 Yet this
assumption is quite doubtful. Given the very low costs of disclosure
to most blackmailers, the social rewards of disclosure, and the
blackmailer's typical disregard for the victim's feelings, it seems
likely that many if not most people who would threaten blackmail
would happily disclose their victim's secret if blackmail were
prevented.
Conversely, it is likely that many who disclose secrets under the
present legal system would consider blackmail if it were legal. Some
victims of these disclosures would prefer to pay blackmail. In
assessing the efficiency of the counterfactual world of legalized
blackmail, one must balance the costs identified by the waste
reduction theorists against the costs of harmful disclosures that
occur under the current system and that would be prevented if
blackmail were legal. The waste reduction theory fails to make its
case in the absence of information about the relative magnitudes of
these two types of cost.
But even granting its assumptions, the waste reduction theory
also fails to account for the differentiation between bribery and
blackmail. Both transactions simply transfer wealth from the victim
to the menace at some transaction cost. Both lead to pointless
deadweight losses and economically sterile exchanges. Both involve
the costs of bilateral monopoly negotiations. No economically
25 Most waste reduction theorists simply assume the contrary. See, e.g., POSNER,
supra note 5, at 69-71 (stating that even though the threatener professes an intent to
disclose the victim's secret, the threatener does not "really" want to carry out the
threat but only obtain the victim's wealth). Some deontological theorists also make
this assumption. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 1746 (acknowledging some blackmail
threats to be genuine, but defining the "central case" of blackmail as one in which the
menace "has no intent or desire to publish the information except as an instrument"
toward the purpose of obtaining an advantage from the victim).
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relevant distinction exists between a menace's saying "yes" to a
victim's offer and a victim's saying "yes" to a menace's threat. Yet
only blackmail is unlawful.
3. "Lawful Blackmail Would Lead to Costly
Reallocative Exchanges."
Coase also sees the law of blackmail as assigning to the victim a
"right not to be blackmailed," which is efficient because the victim
is the party who is likely to value the right most highly. 6 The law
of blackmail is thus argued to be efficient under the eponymous
Coase Theorem, which holds that legal entitlements should, where
possible, be assigned to the party who would bid the most for them,
in order to save transaction costs of reallocative bargaining.
27
Prohibition of blackmail threats saves the transaction costs of the
reallocative blackmail transaction. But Coase seems to have gotten
it backwards. Laws against blackmail prohibit a reallocative bargain
that is made necessary because the right to disclose the secret has
been assigned to the menace. The effect of blackmail statutes is to
disable the victim from buying confidentiality in any bargain that is
initiated by the menace, even though threats by the menace might
be the only way the victim can learn of his risk or of the opportunity
to buy confidentiality. Thus, current law operates exactly opposite
to Coase's prescription: it both assigns the entitlement to the wrong
party and prohibits reallocative bargains necessary to correct the
misassignment.
26 He argues:
In a blackmailing scheme, the person who will pay the most for the
right to stop the action threatened is normally the person being black-
mailed. If the right to stop this action is denied to others, that is, blackmail
is made illegal, transaction costs are reduced, factors of production are
released for other purposes and the value of production is increased. This
is an approach which comes quite naturally to an economist ....
Coase, supra note 23, at 673.
This seems to be inaccurately expressed, since it is only the victim who wants the
"right to stop the action," i.e., to prevent the threatened disclosure. If Coase means
that the victim will always pay more for secrecy than the menace's reservation price
for the right to disclose, then he must explain why the law allocates the disclosure
entitlement to the menace, as argued in the text. If he means instead that the victim
will always pay more for secrecy than third parties will pay for disclosure, then his
assumption is unfounded, as argued in the following subsection.
27 See id. at 673 ("[T]he value of production would be maximized if rights were
deemed to be possessed by those to whom they were most valuable, thus eliminating
the need for any transactions.").
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No useful explanation of the bribery/blackmail distinction can
be deduced from the Coase Theorem. Transaction cost analysis
cannot differentiate between exchanges on the basis of the identity
of the initiating party. Reallocative bargaining initiated by the
menace is no more costly than that initiated by the victim.
4. "Market Price Blackmail Should be Lawful."
Some economic theorists have suggested that blackmail should
be unlawful only in cases in which the blackmailer sells his secrecy
to the victim at a price exceeding the value of the secret to an
alternative purchaser.28 This theory of "market price" blackmail
views the blackmailer's promised secrecy as imposing an opportuni-
ty cost, representing the price he could obtain by disclosing the
secret to a third party. The blackmail transaction permits the victim
to outbid the third party, thus allocating the information or its
secrecy to the highest valued use. Under this theory, the blackmail-
er would act illegally only by charging more than the third party's
bid.
In order to put the market price theory into effect, however, the
court must know the amount that would be bid for the information
by third parties. The defense would appear to be available only in
relatively rare cases in which the defendant is able to produce a bid
from a willing buyer and show that the victim paid no more. Yet,
in those rare cases and in the absence of dynamic effects or
transaction costs, market price blackmail seems to be justifiable.
Nevertheless, there are likely to be dynamic effects and costs.
A victim will often be unable to discern a true market price
blackmailer (in which case the victim may be advised to pay her off)
from a false market price blackmailer (in which case the victim
might not only refuse to pay but might also threaten her with
criminal liability). In most cases, the victim cannot confirm the
third party's bid without risking disclosure of the secret. As a
28 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-86 (1974) (arguing that
a blackmailer "could legitimately charge only for what he forgoes by silence");
Murphy, supra note 23, at 164-65 (arguing that the blackmailer "should be allowed to
offer 'first refusal' to the victim"); cf. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 102
(1981) (noting that although we condemn blackmail generally so "that investments in
the misery of others should not be lucrative," the law should permit recovery of
opportunity costs by ajournalist who acquired the secret he is offering without the
intention of blackmail).
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result, if market price blackmail were legal, a victim might never
discover whether he was actually the victim of a crime.
The economic story of efficient blackmail29 assumes that
secrecy will not impose greater costs on third parties than its
combined utility to the blackmailer and victim. A related, implicit
rationale for legalizing market price blackmail is that to permit the
victim to bid against the third party would foster allocative efficien-
cy: a victim who offers more must value secrecy more than the
third party values disclosure. Yet, when the third party is the
general public, the well known free-rider problem and the cost of
aggregating individual bids may prevent the public from offering
the true total value of disclosure and lead to an inefficient secrecy
agreement.
Even when the third party is an individual with whom the
menace can easily negotiate, transaction costs peculiar to the sale of
information may preclude allocative efficiency. Buyers of irregularly
produced information, such as scandal, face higher costs in
assessing its value to them than do buyers of other goods.30 The
subject matter of the sale, the secret itself, cannot be described to
the buyer for purposes of valuation without disclosing the secret.
One cannot ask a spouse what she would pay to learn that her
husband was a philanderer without giving away most of what one is
trying to sell. She is also unlikely to bid much simply to learn
something of advantage to her. Even disclosing the name of the
competing victim/bidder might give away too much information to
the third party/bidder. A seller is not likely to be freely forthcom-
ing with such information because inadvertent disclosure of the
secret would cost her both possible buyers. In the absence of such
information, however, the third party is unlikely to bid the true
value of the secret.
Thus, even after an auction between victim and third party, one
cannot conclude in general that the outcome, whether a blackmail
exchange or disclosure, is allocatively efficient. The failure to
legalize market price blackmail may represent a societal guess that
disclosure of harmful secrets is generally more valuable than their
2 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
so By contrast, merchant buyers of regularly produced information, such as oil
exploration results or market surveys, are much better able to assess the personal
value of the information before they learn the content. For a discussion on
determining the proper price for information, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at
112-16.
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concealment. A similar guess about the relative magnitudes of
efficient blackmail transaction costs was seen to underlie the
arguments for and against the waste reduction theories. The crucial
role of such raw guesswork undermines the economist's rhetorical
pose of scientific neutrality by exposing the moment at which he
chooses which story he will tell, a choice that is not validated by
economic rationality.
Even were the economic argument against market price
blackmail persuasive, however, it would be equally applicable to
noncriminal bribery. Bribers, like blackmail victims, must decide
whether and how much to bid with incomplete information about
the menace's intention. So far as third parties are concerned, a
successful bribe creates the same externalities as the corresponding
blackmail exchange. Potential bribe-takers might even invest in
secret gathering, with the hope of inducing bribe offers. The
defense of the status quo against the subversive market price
blackmail theories leaves even fewer justifications for the legality of
bribery.
In summary, although existing economic justifications for
prohibiting blackmail offer plausible stories about its inefficiency,
they cannot exclude equally plausible, yet contrary stories that
legalized blackmail would be efficient. Moreover, none of the
existing economic explanations justifies the radically different
treatment accorded to substantively identical exchanges by the
blackmail/bribery boundary.
C. Blackmail Is Not Economically Dfferent from Bribery
The economic theories justifying the prohibition of blackmail
are inconclusive because of the uncertain cost that outlawing
blackmail entails. But assume that economic reasoning could
somehow demonstrate that laws against blackmail are efficient. If
so, could it also justify the legality of bribery?
As I have discussed above, most economic justifications for
criminalizing all blackmail apply equally well to criminalizing all
bribery. I can suggest only two potential economic reasons to
differentiate blackmail from bribery. First, as waste reduction
theorists contend, outlawing blackmail may reduce investments by
potential menaces in discovering secrets and by potential victims in
hiding them. By contrast, legalized bribery seems to entail a lower
risk of such investments. A menace whose threats will be barred
may be less likely to invest in discovering a secret because she
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cannot depend on revealing her knowledge and selling forbearance.
Investing in becoming a blackmailer seems more promising than
investing in becoming a bribe-taker.
This justification seems weak, however, because a threat is not
always necessary to induce an exchange. Without uttering a threat,
menaces can often induce a bribe by openly gaining the power to
harm the victim. For example, the civil plaintiff who has discovered
a "smoking gun" document can confidently sit back and await a
generous settlement offer. Similarly, a corporate raider hoping for
greenmail makes her "threat" apparent by openly purchasing the
target company's stock. The problem of interpretation makes the
threat requirement too crude to distinguish blackmailers from bribe-
takers. Thus, it may be feasible for a potential bribe-taker to invest
in learning secrets.
The second possible justification for the distinction turns on the
costs associated with bluffing that legalized blackmail might entail.
In most forbearance exchange situations, the possibility of bluffing
increases the transaction costs borne by both victims and menaces.
Victims incur information costs in unmasking bluffs and certifying
true threats. Victims also incur the costs of mistakes: an unneces-
sary exchange when they believe a threat that turns out to have been
a bluff, a lost opportunity to exchange when what they believe to be
a bluff turns out to have been a true threat. On the other side of
the transaction, menaces incur the costs of masking bluffs'.and of
making their true threats credible. They, too, will often suffer
increased costs if their true threats are mistaken for bluffs because
they will have to incur the increased cost of making good on their
threat rather than incur the smaller costs of a forbearance exchange.
Because bluffs arise only when menaces make threats, not when
victims make offers, one might explain the legality of bribery and
the illegality of blackmail by the idea that victim-initiated exchanges
are less likely than menace-initiated exchanges to be the product of
a bluff. With the possibility of bluffing removed, bribes are
statistically more likely to occur in situations in which the disclosure
will occur in the absence of exchange.
While this justification might have some appeal in cases of other
extortive forbearance exchanges in which a menace will incur
significant costs in making good on her threat, it is unlikely that the
cost of bluffing is significant in most blackmail transactions.3 1 The
51 A notable exception occurs when the menace is a coparticipant in crime or
embarrassing activity that she threatens to disclose. Here she may face significant
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simple disclosure of a secret will rarely cost the menace anything.
Because the victim can never assure himself that the menace is
bluffing, he will not incur the cost of ascertaining the sincerity of
the menace's threat. Moreover, once a bribery negotiation begins,
the menace's refusal to accept the victim's initial offers will lead to
the same uncertainty and costly stratagems as occur when the
menace makes the first move. A menace may "bluff" by refusing a
bribe offer that exceeds her true reservation price.
In summary, even assuming that the blackmail transaction is
inefficient, there seems to be no economic justification for the
legality of bribery. At most, the rule discriminates among the
relevant threat situations crudely and imposes costs of its own that
are impossible to compare to its benefits.
II. A CRITIQUE OF LINDGREN'S RIGHTS THEORY OF BLACKMAIL
An account of the blackmail theory wars must give special
consideration to their most prolific and persistent combatant,
Professor James Lindgren. In a series of articles,3 2  Professor
Lindgren has attacked all previously and subsequently articulated
theories on grounds that each of them fails to account for at least
some recognized cases of blackmail. In his phrase, he seeks to
"unravel" the paradox of blackmail by creating a coherent theory
that explains the variety of blackmail cases by a single principle. His
project is unusual in seeking to provide both a descriptive and a
normative account by use of a single principle.
3 3
costs of disclosure and the victim may be genuinely uncertain about whether she will
fulfill her threat. An additional element of bluffing is always present after a
blackmailer has made an illegal blackmail threat: if she discloses the secret, she frees
the victim to accuse her of attempted blackmail. The victim may counter-threaten the
menace in such circumstances and the menace's costs of disclosure may increase
accordingly.
32 SeeJames Lindgren, Blackmail" On Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 597 (1989); James Lindgren, In Defense of Keeping Blackmail a Crime:
Responding to Block and Gordon, 20 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 35 (1986) [hereinafter Lindgren,
Responding];James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
670 (1984) [hereinafter Lindgren, Unraveling]; James Lindgren, Blackmail and
Extortion, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 115 (Sanford H. Kadish ed.,
1983).
33 I say "unusual" because of the improbability that a principle would perfectly
replicate the operation of a legal rule without being simply a restatement of the rule
in different language. A normative theory that purports to justify a rule and that
does not conflict with at least some of the rule's applications is also likely just a
restatement of the rule.
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Lindgren begins by rejecting the naive notion that blackmail law
is intended to protect the victims of blackmail from improper
pressure. Instead, he focuses on the persons from whom victims
want to keep their secrets, such as spouses, business associates, law
enforcement agencies, and the curious public. The victim's fear of
disclosure arises because such third parties have the power to harm
the victim if they learn the truth, a power Lindgren refers to as
"leverage."3 4 Such leverage takes various forms, such as example
the power to prosecute the victim for a crime, to sue the victim for
damages or divorce, or to ridicule the victim. Lindgren argues that
blackmail is prohibited in order to prevent the blackmailer from
using the leverage of such third parties against the victim, or, as he
puts it, "bargaining with... [their] chips."
3 5
The normative argument undergirding this theory is that the law
should assign the exclusive power to enforce a right to the one who
possesses the right.36 Third parties, from whom the victim wishes
to keep his secret, have the right to harm the victim if they learn of
the secret. The blackmailer, an interloper, has no standing to
enforce this right.3 7  Lindgren thus unravels the paradox of
blackmail by knitting one of his own: we outlaw blackmail in order
to protect the exclusive power of third parties to harm the victims
of blackmail.
This provocative thesis38 is vulnerable to four types of objec-
tions: descriptive incompleteness, inadequate normative justifica-
tion, normative overbreadth, and failure to account for the legality
of bribery. Some time will be spent developing these critiques
because some apply to other rights-based theories as well.
34 See Lindgren, Unraveling, supra note 32, at 702.
35 Id. He states elsewhere: "Whoever seeks a personal payoffby credibly wielding
the ower of a third party to harm the victim is a blackmailer." Id. at 703.
6 See id. at 704 (arguing that "blackmail law is a manifestation of a core principle
of our legal system, the assignment of enforcement rights to the victim").
37 Lindgren argues that his thesis rationalizes the "claim of right" defense whereby
threats that would otherwise be blackmail are permitted if the threatener is seeking
restitution or damages arising out of the circumstances of the secret. See id. at 676-
80, 713-16; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 cmt. g (1980). But the threat to
disclose a secret will always be to use the leverage of third parties to the extent that
disclosure is different from merely pressing the claim. Thus, the third-party thesis
does not explain the legality of a threatener using a claim of right defense to a charge
that she threatened to disclose an embarrassing secret.
38 The Lindgren thesis has been criticized by Block, Gordon, and Coase. See
Walter Block & David Gordon, Blackmai4 Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Posner,
Epstein, Nozick and Lindgren, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 37, 51-53 (1985); Coase, supra note
23, at 674.
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A. Descriptive Incompleteness
Perhaps the least important objection against the thesis is that
it fails to satisfy Lindgren's own comprehensiveness criterion and so
is vulnerable to the criticism that he levels against all other
blackmail theorists: it does not apply to all cases of blackmail. The
theory omits many cases of blackmail in which the potential harm
from the disclosure cannot be meaningfully said to represent a third
party's leverage. Because his theory is unified, this descriptive
inadequacy also undercuts his normative arguments against
blackmail.
Consider the following hypothetical case: in order to protect his
mother's feelings, a son pays a menace who threatens to expose his
father's marital infidelity to his mother.3 9 The victim, the son, is
not exposed to any leverage by his mother, who cannot use the
information in any way to harm him. Nor is the son acting as an
agent on behalf of his father to protect him from his mother's
leverage. His motive is solely to protect his mother from the pain
of learning the secret, not to neutralize any leverage she may have
against his father.
Lindgren's third-party thesis omits such cases. The blackmailer
is exploiting the son's concern for the third party (the mother), not
the mother's leverage over the son. If the blackmailer is using
anyone's "chips," she is using only her own. Thus, not all blackmail
involves the blackmailer's appropriation of the leverage of a third
party.40 Some blackmail simply exploits the victim's concern for
the third party's feelings.
39 The definition of blackmail in the Model Penal Code extends to threats to harm
"any person" by exposure of the secret, not just the victim. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 223.4(3) (1980); see, e.g., State v. McInnes, 153 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (finding that the victim was a corporate officer who was trying to avoid
disclosure of a secret harmful to the corporation).
40 Lindgren seems not to have considered that the blackmailer's disclosure may
threaten harm not to the victim but to some third party.
The blackmail victim pays the blackmailer to avoid involving third parties;
he pays to avoid being harmed by persons other than the blackmailer. When
the reputation of a person is damaged, he is punished by all those who
change their opinion of him. They may "punish" him by treating him
differently or he may be punished merely by the knowledge that others no
longer respect him.
Lindgren, Unraveling, supra note 32, at 702. Third parties are always "involved" in
a threat to disclose a secret, but they do not always "punish" the victim, even in the
attenuated sense suggested by this quotation.
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Intuition suggests that this is a serious omission. It is likely that
much spousal blackmail is paid at least in part out of similar
motives. A philanderer may pay hush money more to protect the
feelings of the betrayed spouse than to protect himself from her
reaction. Thus, in many garden-variety cases of blackmail, it is
simply inaccurate to describe the blackmailer as usurping the
leverage of a third party over the blackmail victim.
B. Inadequate Normative Justtfication
A more serious objection to the leverage thesis is that it neither
explains the immorality of blackmail nor legitimizes its criminaliza-
tion. Lindgren fails to establish that the per se protection of the
exclusivity of third-party leverage over the victim warrants the law's
protection. A third party's leverage over the victim of secrets'
blackmail may be illegitimate and even criminal. One may blackmail
a battered wife by a threat to tell her husband where she is hiding,
or blackmail a person in a witness protection program by a threat
to publicize his identity. The leverage the blackmailer uses in these
cases is the threat by the husband or the gangsters to criminally
injure the victim.4 1 What is wrongful about such blackmail is not
that it misappropriates leverage from its rightful owner but that it
may harm the victim.
Nor is this problem limited to the use of leverage which would
be criminal if used directly. Blackmailers often use noncriminal
leverage of questionable legitimacy, such as the risk of embarrass-
ment posed to public figures by readers of scandal magazines.
Lindgren's thesis forces him to maintain that such leverage merits
protection by criminal sanctions even though it is not even
protected by the law of property. A third party's illegitimate or
prurient interest in learning the secret and harming the victim
cannot justify criminalizing the blackmailer's attempt to "appropri-
ate" it.
42
41 If the third party in such a case were directly to threaten to use his leverage to
obtain property from the victim, he would commit the crime of extortion.
42 See Lindgren, Unraveling, supra note 32, at 706. Lindgren uses various similar
terms to characterize the supposed effects of the blackmail exchange on the third
party. Sometimes he speaks of "suppressing" the third party's claim, see id. at 702,
705-07, sometimes of "settling" it, see id. at 702, 706-07. These terms are equally
inapposite.
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C. Normative Overbreadth
The "misappropriation of leverage" thesis overlooks the conflict
between its claim that the law protects third-party leverage and the
fact that the same law encourages or permits many exchanges meant
to reduce such leverage. For example, a person may quite lawfully
engage in market exchanges that have as their sole purpose the
preservation of the buyer's secrets from others.43 In numerous
lawful exchanges a potential menace receives compensation for
promising not to disclose harmful secrets to third parties. Govern-
ment employees, corporate employees, and professionals such as
attorneys enter into binding confidentiality agreements at the
beginning of their business or professional relationships whereby
they accept compensation for agreeing not to disclose secrets to
third parties who might exert leverage against their employers or
their clients.44 From the perspective of third parties, such sales of
confidentiality neutralize third-party leverage over the client.
But these exchanges do not violate the principle that rights are
enforceable only by those who possess them. Professional secret-
keepers do not misappropriate the leverage of the nosy public, the
business competitor, or the legal adversary when they sell a promise
of confidentiality because those third parties have no property in or
claim to the secret. Nor do blackmailers appropriate such leverage.
Blackmail leaves the third party as fully empowered to harm the
victim as he was before it. Third parties have no interest in the
blackmail transaction, as is confirmed by the fact that the common
law gives them no claim for compensation against either the
blackmailer or the victim.
The leverage thesis also fails to explain why professional secret-
keepers who are potential menaces may lawfully insist on payment
for confidentiality agreements before they learn of the information
43 The general topic of secret-keeping has received some theoretical attention, of
which the most comprehensive is KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS (1988); see also
SISSELA BOK, SECRETS (1984); POSNER, supra note 18, at 231-347; Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1978).
44 Confidentiality is a mandatory term of the attorney-client contract by virtue of
the rules of professional conduct. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 (1990); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101, EC 4-4
(1981); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (enforcing
reporter's promise of confidentiality given to informant); Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (enforcing CIA agent's employment contract prohibiting
disclosure without official clearance required).
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but may not lawfully make an identical demand after they learn of
the information. Thus, an executive's demand for payment for her
confidentiality made when she is hired is legal, while her demand
for payment for keeping her employer's secret after she learns of it
is blackmail. 45  Because of its exclusive focus on third-party
leverage, Lindgren's theory cannot discriminate between these two
cases.46  In both cases, the victim pays the menace to prevent
disclosure of information to third parties who could use the
information to harm the victim. In both cases, the menace is
bargaining with the chips of the third parties, from whose perspec-
tive both exchanges are equally destructive of leverage.
Although Lindgren's disregard of victims' interests prevents his
theory from explaining the difference between ex ante and ex post
agreements, the difference is easily explained from a victim's
perspective. As noted above, the victim can obtain secrecy at a
competitive price in the ex ante exchange but must pay a monopolis-
tic price in the ex post exchange. In the ex ante exchange, the victim
chooses to disclose his secret to the menace in order to gain from
the professional or business relationship, whereas no such gain
results from the ex post exchange.
The flaws in Lindgren's thesis arise because it ignores the
interests of the blackmail victim.4 7 Contrary to Lindgren's analy-
sis, the law of blackmail seems to be indifferent to the interests of
third parties in learning victims' secrets. The law freely permits all
sorts of transactions, including forbearance exchanges, that frustrate
these interests. The legality of these transactions strongly suggests
that any attempt to explain the paradox of blackmail by shifting the
focus away from the victim will be unsuccessful.
45 See State v. McInnes, 153 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that
employee's threat to expose employer's tax fraud constituted extortion).
46 Lindgren criticizes Epstein's theory because it would find such transactions to
be blackmail because they involve money for concealment, but claims that his third-
party thesis is not affected by the legality of such exchanges because no threat is used.
See Lindgren, Unraveling, supra note 32, at 706. Yet, from the third party's
perspective, the money is paid to defeat the third party's leverage over the victim and
so the transaction should be offensive under Lindgren's theory whether or not a
threat is made.
17 In view of the novelty of his thesis, Lindgren can perhaps be forgiven for
occasionally seeming to forget the radical change his thesis makes in diverting
attention from the interests of the victim to those of the third party. For example,
he charges theorists who support the legalization of blackmail secrets with ignoring
the "lives ruined by persistent blackmailers." Lindgren, Responding, supra note 32, at
36. Are these not the lives of the blackmail victims rather than those of the third
parties whose leverage was misappropriated?
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D. Failure to Account for the Legality of Bribety
A final and critical inconsistency in Lindgren's third-party thesis
is that it overlooks the legality of bribes that accomplish the same
result as blackmail, from the third party's point of view. The law of
blackmail prohibits the menace from initiating a forbearance
exchange by a threat but does not criminalize her for accepting an
exchange offered by a victim. Consider the following examples:
IA: An employee who is planning to retire has learned a secret
harmful to her employer's business. After retirement, she will be
able to disclose the secret without violating any legal duty that she
owes to the employer. She threatens that she will expose the
secret unless the employer pays her off. The employee thereby
commits blackmail.
4 8
IB: Without being threatened, the same employer offers sever-
ance pay to the employee conditioned on her agreement not to
expose its harmful secrets. 49 In accepting this payment on these
terms, the employee is not guilty of blackmail.
2A: During discovery, a plaintiff in a products liability lawsuit
obtains evidence of the defendant's liability for many similar
claims. The plaintiff threatens to publicize the document unless
the defendant agrees to pay a handsome settlement. The plaintiff
is probably guilty of blackmail.50
41 See, e.g., State v. Mclnnes, 153 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding
that employee's threat to expose employer's tax fraud constituted extortion); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(7) & cmt. 2(k) (1980) (providing general prohibition
against blackmail where the menace "inflict[s] any other harm which would not
benefit the actor").
49 Such agreements are now common. See N.R. Kleinfield, Silence is Golden, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, § 6 (Magazine) at 54, 54 ('[T]he fact is corporations are
increasingly sealing the lips of employees with the corporate equivalent of a gag
order.").
50 Cf. State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692, 699 (Vt. 1969) (stating that threats to use
secret information to obtain a favorable settlement in a divorce action constituted
extortion);Joseph M. Livermore, Lawyer Extortion, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 403,407-08 (1978)
(arguing that threatening to publicize embarrassing allegations in a proposed civil
claim in order to procure settlement may amount to extortion).
On the rights of plaintiffs to profit by disclosure of discovery information to
third parties, compare Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability
Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 819-27 (1990) (discussing
plaintiffs' right to disseminate discovery materials to nonparties and noting the risk
that litigation could be aimed primarily at discovery of information that can be sold
to other litigants) with Brad N. Friedman, Note, Mass Products Liability Litigation: A
ProposalforDissemination of Discovered Material Covered by a Protective Order, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1137, 1148 (1985) (proposing that selling or sharing discovery information
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2B: During discovery, the plaintiff in a products liability lawsuit
obtains evidence of the defendant's liability for many similar
claims. Without being threatened, the defendant offers to pay the
plaintiff a handsome settlement conditioned upon plaintiff's
agreement not to disclose the evidence. The plaintiff is not guilty
of blackmail and the agreement is enforceable.
5 1
Lindgren's bargaining chips hypothesis fails to explain why such
exchanges are legal if, but only if, the victim makes the first move.
The consideration the victim offers in such exchanges will always
reflect third-party leverage, yet the exchange is lawful so long as it
does not result from the menace's threat. If the law's policy really
were to protect the exclusivity of the leverage of third parties, it
would be irrationally inconsistent to criminalize blackmail while
ignoring this form of bribery. From the third party's perspective,
bribery and blackmail are equally destructive of leverage. Thus, the
attempt to resolve the paradox of blackmail by taking up the point
of view of third parties must fail.
Something must be said about the more usual attempt to
rationalize the law of blackmail as a violation of the rights of the
victim. In what I have described as "efficient" blackmail, the
menace intends to make the disclosure in the absence of an
exchange and the disclosure would not violate any right of the
victim. In such a case, the victim would certainly want the right to
initiate the bargaining process and purchase confidentiality. But
several theorists claim that the victim's rights are violated if the
menace takes the first step. Thus, for example, Professors Fletcher
and Gordon each argue that it is not at all "paradoxical" to outlaw
a threat to do a lawful act.5 2 Concededly, it does not defy logic to
among similarly situated plaintiffs in products liability cases be permitted).
" In order to protect themselves from other claims and from adverse publicity,
defendants who settle claims often demand that plaintiffs return all copies of
documents obtained in the lawsuit and keep confidential any harmful information
that they have obtained during the course of discovery. See Court Secrecy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciay, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (exploring data concerning the use of
confidentiality in litigation); Irwin D. Miller, Breaking the Written Code of Silence in
Legal Malpractice Settlements, 6 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHics 187, 189-91 (1992) (criticizing
the use of confidentiality agreements in the settlement of legal malpractice claims as
interfering with the reporting necessary to attorney disciplinary bodies). In speaking
of settlements in cases of sexual harassment against law firms, one attorney noted that
"[t]he good cases settle for big bucks, and part of the deal is to keep your mouth
shut." David Margolick, Curbing Sexual Harassment in the Legal World, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1990, at B5 (quoting Boston lawyer S. Beville May).
52 See George P. Fletcher, Blackmai" The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
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permit an action (the disclosure) while prohibiting a communication
about the action (the threat).
Even if "paradox" is too strong a term, it nevertheless seems
more than merely "interesting" that the law should outlaw the
communication of truthful information by one person only.53
Assume, for example, that a menace prefers to disclose a victim's
harmful secret but would be willing to accept no less than $1000 for
silence. A menace may lawfully act on such preferences, so long as
she does not threaten the victim. That the menace holds these
lawful preferences is a fact about the victim's world that affects the
victim's interests. Now assume that a friend of the victim learns of
these preferences and, without the menace's knowledge, communi-
cates them to the victim, who then bribes the menace to keep the
secret. In common parlance, the friend has "warned," not "threat-
ened," the victim, and has committed no crime in communicating
truthful information about the menace's lawful preferences. The
victim is presumably grateful for such information, regardless of its
source. Because the law seeks to suppress neither the preferences
themselves nor their communication by persons other than the
menace, it indeed seems paradoxical to criminalize the threat and
not the warning.
54
Professor Gordon also argues that criminalizing blackmail gives
the victim a resource with which to resist the blackmailer's pressure.
A victim who refuses to pay can counter-threaten a blackmailer with
criminal liability if the blackmailer exposes the secret.55 Yet the
victim's "counter-threat" to file a criminal charge if the blackmailer
subsequently engages in lawful speech could itself be characterized
as criminal coercion.56 Professor Gordon refers to this as "coun-
1617, 1626-29 (1993) (arguing that blackmail is wrong and therefore punishable
because it creates a relationship of dominance and subordination); Gordon, supra
note 3, at 1742-46 (arguing that blackmail is not "paradoxical" in the strict sense of
the word on theoretical, policy-oriented, and empirical grounds).
53 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 1742.
' Because it would not be lawful for an extortionist to act on her preferences, this
analysis does not apply to an extortionist's threat.
55 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 1775-77. This point is also made byjudge Posner
and Professors Shavell and Feinberg. See JOEL FEINBERG, 4 MORAL LIMrrs OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOINGS 268 (1988) (arguing that counterblackmail
may be justifiable, but still illegal); Richard A. Posner, Blackmai; Privacy, and Freedom
of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1837-38 (1993) (arguing that by giving the victim
proof of blackmail, a blackmailer may open herself to counterblackmail); Steven
Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmai4 Extortion, and
Robberj, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1877,1883-84 (1993) (arguing that the economic incentive
to blackmail is often outweighed by the threat of punishment).
56 "A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict
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ter-blackmail" and argues that prosecutors should refuse to
prosecute as a matter of policy. On her assumptions, such a policy
seems reasonable. But what about a hypothetical politician who
threatens an investigative journalist that if he published a story
about her, she will (falsely) accuse the journalist of having tried to
blackmail her? If the journalist files charges, the politician will
claim to be a "counter-blackmailer" who should not be prosecuted.
The example illustrates that blackmail statutes can themselves be
used as instruments of new forms of blackmail or criminal coer-
cion.
57
III. BRIBERY AND BLACKMAIL AS NARRATIVES OF COMMUNITY
"But who is he?"
"I'll tell you, Watson. He is the king of all the blackmailers. Heaven
help the man, and still more the woman, whose secret and reputation come
into the power of Milverton! With a smiling face and a heart of marble,
he will squeeze and squeeze until he has drained them dy.... I have said
that he is the worst man in London, and I would ask you how could one
compare the ruffian, who in hot blood bludgeons his mate, with this man,
who methodically and at his leisure tortures the soul and wrings the nerves
in order to add to his already swollen money-bags?"
another's freedom of action to his detriment, he threatens to:... (b) accuse anyone
of a criminal offense .... " MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (1985). Professor Gordon
argues that the victim here is justified because he is demanding that the menace
merely withdraw her unlawful threat. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 1776-77. But,
because the blackmailer's threat has failed, and the blackmailer retains the lawful
right to disclose the secret, the victim's counter-threat cannot be justified by a claim-
of-right defense to a charge of criminal coercion. The Model Penal Code provides
in pertinent part:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution... that the actor believed that
accusation. . to be true... and that his purpose was limited to compelling
the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which
were the subject of the accusation, ... as by desisting from further
misbehavior, [or] making good a wrong done ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5. The victim has no honest claim of right to confidentiali-
ty either before or after the blackmail threat. The relevant difference is between the
two lawful threats: (1) "If you steal from me, I will tell the police," and (2) "If you
don't give back what you stole from me, I will tell the police," and the unlawful threat
(3) "If you disclose my secret, I will tell the police you tried to steal from me." The
latter threat constitutes criminal coercion because the threatener has no legitimate
claim to confidentiality. Similarly coercive is: (4) "If you disclose my secret, I will tell
the police you tried to blackmail me."
57 The rare quality of a criminal statute creating incentives to violate itself is
shared by perjury statutes that penalize inconsistent testimony. See Sidney W.
DeLong, Testimonial Consistency: The Hobgoblin of the Federal False Declaration Statute,
66 DENV. U. L. REV. 135, 138-39 (1989).
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"But surely," said I, "the fellow must be within the grasp of the law?"
"Technically, no doubt, but practically not. What would it profit a
woman, for example, to get him afew months's imprisonment if her own
ruin must immediately follow? His victims dare not hit back. "5
Why does blackmail strike us as so wrongful? So wrongful that
even in the midst of a transaction cost analysis, the economist
Ronald Coase would refer to it as "moral murder?"59 None of the
foregoing theories seems to touch the nerve that the blackmailer
rubs; none explains the societal abhorrence of the blackmailer's
craft. Purely economic explanations of the criminal law often
produce bizarre conclusions, such as that blackmail rules are
intended to reduce expenditures by blackmailers. Such provoca-
tions are part of the charm of economic analysis. We all know that
blackmail laws are meant to do more than prevent waste. Admitted-
ly, it is no criticism of an economic theory that it does not seek to
make such normative arguments for that is not a task it has set for
itself. 60 But a legal theory that does not explain the wrongness of
a blackmailer's behavior is in need of supplementation, unless one
takes the view that the law is indifferent to morality.
61
A different way to understand the legal treatment of both
blackmail and bribery is by reference to their social meaning rather
than their economic effects. I suggest that society understands
bribery and blackmail not as rationally consistent, mutually exclusive
categories within a coherent legal or ethical order but as unrelated
prototypes whose application to social facts might well overlap.
Each transaction is associated with a narrative description of its
standard case through which its social meaning is revealed. The
justifications for the different legal treatment of bribery and
58 ARTHUR C. DOYLE, The Adventure of Charles Augustus Milverton, in THE RETURN
OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, reprinted in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 481, 572-73
(1960).
59 Coase, supra note 23, at 675.
60 See generally HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM 281-92
(1988).
61 Even Professor Coase seems to acknowledge this as he searches for a rationale
for the fact that, efficiency aside, society abhors blackmail as "the foulest of crimes."
Coase, supra note 23, at 674 (quoting BECHHOFER ROBERTS, THE MR. A. CASE 9
(Bechhofer Roberts ed., The Old Baily Trial Series, No. 7, 1950)). Coase reasoned
that the blackmailer does not operate under the constraints of an ordinary
businessman and that blackmail's unending threat leads to "moral murder." Id. at
675. He nevertheless concluded "[ilt would be a sad day if all the answers had to be
provided by economists." Id. at 676.
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blackmail may seem to reside more in intuition than in instrumen-
talist logic,62 but they can equally be seen to arise from a vision of
social order that is more communitarian than individualist.
In the story of blackmail, the blackmailer is the protagonist, the
agent whose action is directed at her victim. She knows a secret
whose disclosure would exclude the victim in important ways from
his community. The blackmailer hopes that her threat will inflict
sufficient emotional distress on the victim to cause him to pay in
order to preserve the security of his social status or role in the
community.
The victim is not only injured, but is silenced and isolated by the
threat. He cannot complain or seek help for his dilemma without
abandoning that which he wants to preserve.63  His relationship
with the blackmailer becomes a second secret. His efforts to raise
money to pay blackmail further deepens his secret life. The
blackmail story is one of bitter irony, in which the victim must
actively participate in the crime, protecting the menace in order to
protect himself, and must distance himself even farther from his
community in order to preserve his connection to it.
Blackmail is an oppressive relationship, not a discrete event like
most other crimes. 64 The victim is bound to the blackmailer in a
relationship that continues for so long as the blackmailer retains the
power to disclose the secret.65 The victim buys nothing certain
62 See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897)
("The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man.").
63 In most other social interactions, a person cannot initiate an offensive contact
with another person while compelling the second person to keep the contact a secret.
There are exceptions, however: the current moral and political climate makes it
costly for victims of sexual abuse or harassment to expose the wrongful contact.
64 Some other criminal activities are constituted by oppressive relationships that
involve repeated interactions between an oppressor and a victim who has no power
to end the relationship, such as child abuse, spousal abuse, and slavery. Most crimes,
however, are discrete interactions in which victims can seek protection from society
after they are harmed.
65 It was this characteristic that Ronald Coase had in mind when he referred to
this relationship as "moral murder." Coase, supra note 23, at 675. A blackmailer who
"bleeds" the victim by repeated demands can capture virtually all the victim's surplus
from the exchange, making the victim almost as bad off as if disclosure had occurred.
See supra note 13. It should be noted, however, that the bilateral monopoly
relationship between blackmailer and victim may work to the victim's advantage. A
victim may realize a substantial surplus if he values secrecy more highly than his
entire wealth.
Moreover, because blackmail is unlawful, the blackmailer's leverage may often
be offset by the victim's leverage. A blackmailer who threatens to disclose after the
first payment is made can be met with a counter-threat to file a criminal charge of
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with his payment because the blackmailer can renege on her
promise of silence and demand more money, bleeding the victim
indefinitely.
66
There are two sides to society's moral response to the blackmail
story. The victim, whose crime or immoral act would have merited
censure in another story, engenders sympathy because of his
suffering. Perhaps because of universal fear of exclusion, the
blackmail story elicits a strong identification with the victim's
hopelessness and isolation.
The second side to the normative meaning of the blackmail story
is our condemnation of the menace's attempt to profit from her
threat.67 A person who simply exposes a victim's guilty secret to
society may be said to violate one community in the interest of
another: she betrays the victim while benefiting those to whom the
secret is revealed. The victim's snitch is society's whistleblower.
But a blackmailer betrays both communities and can claim respect
from neither. She is a traitor, who betrays the victim by demanding
money for silence and betrays the public by accepting it. Blackmail
thus entails a double isolation and a double crime against communi-
ty-
If this account of our phenomenological response to blackmail
is accurate, it suggests that the purpose of the law of blackmail is to
protect the community against the conspiratorial agreement of
blackmailer and victim, which isolates the victim and subjects him
to a submissive relationship with the blackmailer. The prototypical
story of blackmail can achieve its normative justification only by
suppressing and excluding certain possibilities-possibilities that
have constituted some of the problematic cases. Thus, this story
ignores both the cost of nondisclosure to the blackmailer and the
victim's eagerness to buy secrecy.
blackmail if she does. The parties are thus in a state of mutually assured destruction,
whereby each is both menace and victim. Outlawing the blackmail exchange thus has
thexaradoxical effect of making it more enforceable.
An often overlooked reason for outlawingblackmail is to avoid the violence that
might be engendered by the victim's desperation. The intensity of a victim's reaction
to blackmail may be something that the law simply wants to avoid.
67 When we view a threat as a legitimate maneuver in a market economy, we are
prepared to countenance a considerable degree of suffering by the victim. See Robert
L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 624-28
(1943) (describing the free market as a form of coercion); Robert L. Hale, Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sc!. Q. 470, 471-74 (1923)
(giving examples of allowable market coercion).
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The prototypical story of noncriminal bribery proceeds from a
different point of view and arises from different perspectives on the
effects of secrecy on community.68 In the bribe story, the active
agent is the victim, not the menace. Only if he can maintain his
secret can the victim preserve his valuable place in the community.
Bribery permits him to construct or reinforce this essential secrecy
by purchasing the cooperation of the menace, whose innocent
disclosure might threaten the victim's interests. Through bribery,
the victim transforms the menace into an ally whose cooperation
preserves the victim's place in the larger community.69  The
menace accepts the bribe to compensate her for joining this
enterprise.
The different perspective of the bribery story induces different
normative responses. While blackmail is something the menace
does, bribery is something the victim does. The blackmailer
threatens; the briber offers. Blackmail makes the victim worse off;
bribery makes him better off. Bribery elicits neither a sense that the
victim has been exploited nor a sense that the menace has betrayed
the community.
Yet these reactions are largely the result of the narrative
framework of the bribe story. First, like the blackmail story, the
bribe story tends to exclude possibilities that would undermine
these reactions. It does not consider that the menace may have
subtly threatened the victim or that once the negotiation begins, the
menace may hold out for an exploitative price. Second, the focus
on agent and action peculiar to the two stories obscures the
substantive equivalence of the exchanges. It is apparent that many
transactions could fit either story. The difference between
blackmail and bribery is at the level of social meaning rather than
economic or deontological logic.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the original unconditional threat/conditional
threat paradox has yielded several new paradoxes of blackmail.
Some are paradoxes of counter-productivity. Thus, outlawing
blackmail may create opportunities for new forms of blackmail, as
in the case of counter-blackmail. Outlawing blackmail may also
68 See SCHEPPELE, supra note 43, at 301-16.
69 For a discussion on the effect ofsecret-keepingand the creation of community
through social distribution of knowledge, see SCHEPPELE, Supra note 43, at 23.
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facilitate the making of otherwise unworkable blackmail exchanges
by giving the victim an enforcement mechanism. Instrumentalist
law abounds in unintended consequences.
A different kind of paradox is presented by the bribery/
blackmail distinction. Economic reasoning seems inadequate to
explain this dichotomy. While economic stories can be told about
the efficiency of the line we draw between blackmail and noncrimi-
nal bribery, these stories seem no more persuasive than their
contraries, at least in the absence of empirical data that we are
unlikely ever to possess. Nor do ethical theories concerning the
victim's rights or the wrongfulness of the threats justify the bribery/
blackmail distinction, at least in cases in which disclosure of the
secret is a real possibility in the absence of exchange. By contrast,
while the prototypical stories of bribery and blackmail fail to satisfy
rationalist criteria, these accounts nevertheless appear to capture
the conflicting societal values these doctrines serve and thus permit
the nontheorist to be reconciled to the second paradox of blackmail.
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